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When acquiring private property, governments may exercise one 
of three options: confiscation, consensual exchange, or eminent 
domain. Under the first approach, the government can confiscate 
private land without seeking consent from private owners and 
without paying compensation to them. Confiscation does not happen 
very often except under certain extraordinary circumstances, such as 
immediately after an outright revolution. The social costs resulting 
from confiscation are historically devastating. Alternatively, under 
the consensual exchange approach, the government can only acquire 
private property through arm’s-length negotiations in an open market. 
It requires the government to obtain consent from private owners and 
pay mutually agreed purchase prices, determined by both the 
government as a willing buyer and private owners as willing sellers. 
When negotiations succeed, consensual exchange is almost always 
beneficial to both parties.1 When negotiations fail, owners retain their 
properties and the government incurs costs without achieving its goal. 
The third approach is through eminent domain, which denotes 
when the government can take private properties for “public use” 
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without owner consent.2 The government can either use the threat of 
eminent domain to hasten “negotiations” or exercise its sovereign 
power to take properties outright and provide the owners 
compensation as set by third parties. These third parties usually 
consist of appraisal firms that calculate the amount of compensation 
based on market value.3 Eminent domain proceedings, as typified by 
language in the Fifth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution,4 require 
that: (1) the property must be for public use; and (2) the owner of the 
property must be provided with just compensation. 
Theoretically, the government should only use eminent domain 
proceedings in situations that involve a bilateral monopoly problem.5 
For example, a bilateral monopoly exists when the government 
cannot complete a public project without acquiring a particular tract 
of land owned by a private party. The private owner, in realizing the 
unique bargaining power he or she possesses, can hold out until the 
government pays a price that far exceeds the property’s market value. 
As a result, exercising eminent domain power becomes necessary for 
the government to avoid paying more than “just compensation.” In 
practice, however, a government often remains the sole authority to 
interpret what constitutes a bilateral monopoly situation; in other 
words, the government gets to say how much is too much. In 
developing economies, such as China, governments rarely opt to use 
methods other than exercising eminent domain power because they 
regard almost all land acquisitions as situations involving bilateral 
monopoly. Most importantly, governments are convinced that using 
eminent domain power is the most efficient way to cut the costs for 
economic development. 
In fact, the legitimate exercise of eminent domain power is by no 
means a free lunch. It can be very costly in jurisdictions where 
constitutional guarantees are fully respected. According to Thomas 
Merrill, the exercise of eminent domain involves at least five costs: 
(1) costs to lobby the legislature to grant eminent domain power; (2) 
 
 2. Id. at 66 
 3. See generally 1-1A NICHOLS ON EMINENT DOMAIN § 1A.03 (1997). 
 4. U.S. CONST. amend. V (provides that no private property can be taken for public use 
without just compensation).  
 5. 3-10 NICHOLS ON EMINENT DOMAIN § 10.03. 
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procedural costs required by the Constitution, to include the drafting 
and filing of formal judicial complaints and service of process on the 
owners; (3) costs associated with professional appraisal services and 
providing for just compensation; (4) costs for the guarantee of 
condemnees’ rights, to include public hearings on the condemnation's 
legality and the amount of compensation required; and (5) costs of 
litigation. Merrill terms these costs as the administrative costs of 
exercising eminent domain power, or due process costs. 
There are two reasons why the administrative costs are essential 
for the efficient use of land resources and protection of private 
property. First, the administrative costs compel the government to 
more thoroughly reexamine its development plan as justified under 
an exercise of eminent domain. Substantial costs effectively force the 
government to search for other alternative means to complete its 
projects, such as purchasing land from an open market. If the 
government can reach the same goal at lower costs through genuine 
negotiations with private owners, the result would be beneficial to 
both sides. Additionally, these costs function as a buffer zone for 
private owners, to not be constantly harassed by unnecessary 
governmental takings. Second, the administrative costs provide an 
essential check on government power. By forcing the government to 
internalize the cost of takings, the administrative costs effectively 
prevent over consumption of property.6 These costs have the effect of 
“disciplining the government, which would otherwise over expand 
unless made to pay for the resources that it consumes.”7  
The objective of this paper is to explore the correlations between 
the level of administrative costs and the likelihood of the abuse of 
eminent domain power. Part I traces the disparate treatment of private 
ownership of urban homes in China since 1949. It explains how and 
why the Chinese government dramatically changed its attitude 
towards private property due to varying ideological beliefs to which it 
subscribed at different times. Part II examines the serious problems 
 
 6. Christopher Serkin, The Meaning of Value: Assessing Just Compensation for 
Regulatory Takings, 99 NW. U. L. REV. 677, 725 (2005). 
 7. William A. Fischel & Perry Shapiro, Takings, Insurance, and Michelman: Comments 
on Economic Interpretations of “Just Compensation” Law, 17 J. LEGAL STUD. 269, 269–70 
(1988). 
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associated with the current takings law in China and provides a 
detailed analysis of the three elements of the takings law: public 
purpose, compensation, and due process of law. Part III briefly 
analyzes the takings laws of the United States and Singapore in 
comparison to China, who is not alone in facing the tension between 
the protection of private ownership and the need for further economic 
development. The purpose of the comparative analysis is to provide 
new perspectives into the debate about how China’s takings law 
should be structured. This section also compares the administrative 
costs of takings among the three jurisdictions. Finally, the paper 
concludes that, among other reasons, the extremely low 
administrative costs of the exercise of eminent domain in China have 
substantially contributed to a massive abuse of eminent domain 
power.   
I. THE FATE OF PRIVATE HOUSING IN CHINA 
Takings is a non-issue in the absence of private ownership. Three 
decades ago, China faced few takings problems, because most urban 
real property was owned by the whole people, who “entrusted” their 
property to the government. As the de facto owner, the government 
had absolute power to use public property at will. Since the 1980s, 
the Chinese government gradually accorded private ownership of 
urban housing because it believed that private property rights were a 
driving force for economic growth. But the government soon began 
to take privately owned homes back and give them to commercial 
developers, whom it believed to be better suited for further economic 
expansion. In competition with the government-backed commercial 
developers, private property owners have consistently lost the battle 
to protect their property.  
A. The Impact of Marxism on Urban Housing in the 1950s 
China’s early policy on private ownership of urban housing was 
based on Marx’s Das Kapital.8 According to Marx, private land 
 
 8. Karl Marx, Capital, Vol III at chs. 21 and 46, Frederick Engels ed., Progress 
Publishers 1971 (1894), available at http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1894-c3/ 
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ownership and private home ownership were different in nature and 
thus should be treated differently after the Proletarian Revolution. 
The reason that landowners were able to extract rent was merely 
because they occupied a piece of natural resource; the owner neither 
made significant contributions to improve his property, nor took any 
risk in generating profits from his land.9 Private land ownership, 
therefore, served as the basis for pure exploitation.10 Unlike private 
landowners, however, homeowners made substantial contributions to 
their properties. The rent income that homeowners received from 
tenants represented a return in the form of interest and amortization 
from their investments.11 Accordingly, Marx stressed the elimination 
of private land ownership and the recognition of private home 
ownership after the Proletariat took power. 
In formulating the early laws and policies on urban housing, the 
Chinese government followed the Marxist doctrine closely. On the 
eve of the establishment of the People’s Republic of China, the 
government publicly responded to a question concerning the nature 
of private rental housing property in urban areas and how the 
government would deal with the homeowners. The reply, entitled 
Policy on the Nature of Urban Housing and Rent (“Housing Policy”), 
was published in The People’s Daily on August 12, 1949.12 In the 
Housing Policy, the government declared that urban housing was not 
a means of feudal exploitation and, therefore, should not be subject to 
confiscation. This policy was a tremendous relief to urban 
homeowners, as the government not only recognized the legitimacy 
of urban home ownership, but also delineated its understanding and 
application of Marx’s theory regarding the distinction between rural 
land ownership and urban home ownership.  
 
index.htm.  
 9. Id. To illustrate his point on the differentiation between ground rent and house rent, 
Marx cited the testimony of Edward Capps (a big building speculator in London) before the 
Select Committee on Bank Acts of 1857. Id. 
 10. Id. 
 11. Id.  
 12. Guanyu Chengshi Fangchan, Fangzu de Xingzhi he Zhengce [Policy on the Nature of 
Urban Housing and Rent], PEOPLE’S DAILY (Beijing), Aug. 11, 1949, available at 
http://bbs.procedurallaw.cn/topic.asp?TOPIC_ID=1464&ARCHIVE=.  
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In the last part of the Housing Policy, the government went 
beyond (or even contradicted) Marx’s theory by arguing that 
recognizing private ownership was the only way to motivate owners 
to maintain and increase housing supply.13 Private investment was 
crucial to meeting increasing demand for housing, because the newly 
established government had no financial means to provide it.14 The 
government acknowledged that some cities failed to observe the 
distinction between rural land and urban housing,15 by either 
confiscating private housing or arbitrarily setting housing rent at 
extremely low levels. Without property protection, homeowners in 
those cities not only stopped maintaining current housing, but also 
stopped investing in building new houses. Consequently, the housing 
stock in those cities dwindled rapidly. Both homeowners and tenants 
suffered greatly from the radical measures.16  
This line of analysis demonstrates that the government was still 
rational to the extent that it heeded the basic laws of economics about 
incentive and property rights at the early stages of the P.R.C. history. 
That consciousness, however, soon was replaced by the radical 
ideology that viewed any form of private property as capitalistic, a 
remnant that should be completely eliminated.17  
B. State—Managed Mandatory Leasing of Private Housing During 
Socialist Transformation (Jingzu) 
The promises in the Housing Policy were only kept for six years 
(1949–1955). When the government carried out this so-called 
“socialization,” it deemed private properties an obstacle to 
developing a socially-planned economy. Private housing was not an 
exception. In the 1950s, private housing accounted for the majority of 
urban housing in large cities such as Beijing and Shanghai. The 
government became concerned over the threat that the high 
 
 13. Id.  
 14. Id.  
 15. Id.  
 16. Id.  
 17. Id. Guanyu Chengshi Fangchan, Fangzu de Xingzhi he Zhengce [Policy on the Nature 
of Urban Housing and Rent], PEOPLE’S DAILY (Beijing), Aug. 11, 1949, available at 
http://bbs.procedurallaw.cn/topic.asp?TOPIC_ID=1464&ARCHIVE=. 
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proportion of private housing posed to the “socialization movement.” 
In 1955, concerned with the threat, the central government issued 
“The Opinions on the Current Situations on Private Housing and 
Opinions for Socialization” (“Opinions”).18 Although the Opinions 
were in the form of government “red tape,” officials regarded them as 
an enactment to formulate local rules on private housing.19  
Unlike the 1949 Housing Policy, the 1955 Opinions blamed 
private owners and real estate brokers for the increasing rental prices 
and shortage of housing construction. The main purpose of the 
Opinions was to set up minimum housing quotas that private owners 
were entitled to occupy. Any space beyond the minimum standard 
had to be rented out to the public at a state-set rate.20 This method 
was called jingzu, the word for state-managed mandatory leasing. 
Under the proposed system, private owners were no longer free to 
decide how much or at what price to lease, despite the fact that they 
still legally retained ownership in their property. The government 
regulated and performed all leasing activities. In addition, the 
government confiscated empty lots and easements owned by private 
parties in urban areas.21  
The government attributed the problems inherent in any real estate 
market to private homeownership. While the government did not 
abolish private homeownership all at once, to many homeowners, 
losing ownership was inevitable. After the Opinions were issued, real 
estate prices fell sharply, resulting in frantic housing sales. These 
frantic sales coupled with a lack of buyers, forced some owners to 
even demolish their houses and sell the wood and bricks for other 
construction use. As a result, the government simply did not achieve 
its goal for increasing housing supply. 
Despite the negative impact that mandatory leasing brought to the 
housing market, local governments faithfully carried it out. In 1958, 
the Beijing government released detailed rules on mandatory leasing, 
 
 18. Zhongyang Shujichu Dier Bangong Shi [Central Committee No. 2 Secretary Office], 
Guanyu Muqian Chengshi Siyou Fangchan Jiben Qingkuang Ji Jinxing Shehui Zhuyi Gaizao de 
Yijian [Current Situations on Private Housing and Opinions for Socialization], Jan. 18, 1955 
(P.R.C.), available at http://sh.focus.cn/newshtml/43563.html. 
 19. Id.  
 20. Id.  
 21. Id.  
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and cities nationwide followed.22 According to the rules, private 
homeowners were entitled to retain a base area of 15 rooms or 225 
square meters for their own use or for private leasing. Any space 
beyond the base area was subject to mandatory leasing. Although the 
government did not take possession of private housing, it acted as an 
agent for private owners in exercising property rights such as entering 
into contracts with tenants and collecting rent. Private owners 
received 20% to 40% of the rent collected by the government.23 In the 
process of carrying out mandatory leasing, some local governments 
deliberately reduced the base area in order to gain more control of 
housing units. In extreme cases, local governments disregarded the 
base area all together. In some cases, private owners were even 
required to pay rent for their own bedrooms.24  
C. Deprivation of Private Housing during the Great Proletarian 
Cultural Revolution  
While mandatory leasing seriously restricted private owners from 
exercising their property rights, private ownership was still 
legitimate, at least in theory. Owners were continuously paid nominal 
rent by the government for leasing their property to the public. When 
the Cultural Revolution broke out in 1966, however, the already 
abridged private property rights were destroyed completely. Acting 
upon the Red Guards’ call for eradicating the remnants of capitalist 
enterprises, the State Council issued The Report on Several Questions 
Concerning Finance, Trade and Handicraft Industry (“Report”) on 
September 23, 1966.25 The Report declared that all public and private 
jointly managed enterprises were to be converted to state-owned 
 
 22. CAO PEI, REAL ESTATE LAW IN CHINA 6 (1998).  
 23. Id.  
 24. Zhang Peng, Bai Wan Hu Chengshi Zuwu, Chanquan Jiuzhang Chongfan [Millions of 
Private Owners Lost Their Houses (During Socialist Transformation). Now is it Time for Them 
to Claim Property Rights?], JINJI [ECON. MAG.], Jan. 15, 2004, available at http://finance.sina. 
com.cn/g/20040115/1108604474.shtml.  
 25. Guanyu Caizheng Maoyi he Shou Gongye Fangmian Ruogan Zhengce Wenti de 
Baogao [Report on Several Issues on the Policies Regarding Finance, Trade, and Handicraft 
Industry] (promulgated by the Finance and Trade Office of the State Council and the State 
Economic Committee, Sept. 24, 1966), document number (1966) 507 (P.R.C.), available at 
http://bbs.procedurallaw.cn/topic.asp?TOPIC_ID=1464&ARCHIVE=.  
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enterprises. The state ceased paying dividends on private securities. 
Even though the Report did not address mandatory leasing, the state 
stopped payment of rent to private homeowners as well. Unlike the 
Housing Policy (1949) and Housing Opinions (1955), which laid out 
the rationale behind the government actions toward private housing, 
the Report offered no explanation for the actions. During the lawless 
period, the Red Guards publicly humiliated intellectuals, overseas 
Chinese, and Party members belonging to disgraced groups, and 
raided and confiscated their homes. The seized properties were either 
turned over to headquarters of “revolutionary organizations” or 
directly occupied by family members of the Red Guards. Because the 
Red Guards seized the legal system, there was no recourse for 
property owners to seek relief. Under intense political pressure, no 
one dared argue that housing was not a means of production and thus 
should be treated differently from capitalist industry and commerce. 
As one of the “achievements” of the Cultural Revolution, private 
homeowners were eliminated through violent means without any 
legal basis. By the end of the 1970s, urban housing was 
predominantly owned by the government. 
D. Public Housing and Housing Shortage 
Following the Soviet model, the government eventually 
monopolized its housing through socialization and became the sole 
provider of public housing.26 As part of a wide range of social 
benefits, housing was allocated to workers with extremely low rents 
in urban areas. People living in rural areas, which made up 
approximately 90% of the total population, were excluded from the 
benefit of public housing.  
The concept of allocated housing with a nominal rent sounded 
appealing to many people, especially to those who paid a 
considerable portion of their income for homes in the West. In 
reality, public housing was not only hard to obtain, but also of low 
quality, because the state viewed housing as a non-productive means 
that could not contribute to economic growth. “Putting production 
first, housing second” was a common political pledge everywhere 
 
 26. Through confiscation, mandatory leasing, and takings.  
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from oil fields to industrial zones during the pre-reform era.27 Thus, 
housing construction and maintenance were not the government’s 
priority. As a result, the state, as the major source of housing 
development, was reluctant to increase production in the housing 
sector. The average living space per capita had dwindled from 4.5 
square meters in 1949 to 3.6 square meters in 1979.28 In addition to 
inadequate investment, the rapid population increase during this 
period also triggered a housing shortage.29 It was not uncommon for 
two or even three generations of a family to live in one flat with less 
than three bedrooms.30 The living conditions were intolerable in the 
overcrowded public housing. In order to create more space with 
limited state investment, designers had no choice but to leave out 
“luxury” items in residential housing. A survey in the early 1990s 
revealed that nearly 60% of public housing was not equipped with 
private toilets and kitchens due to the high cost of installation.31 In 
summary, the problems associated with the pre-reform housing 
policy were a result of scarcity of supply, low standards, and poor 
maintenance.32  
 
 27. SHIWEI CHENG, ZHONGGUO CHENGZHEN ZHUFANG ZHIDU GAIGE-MUBIAO MOSHI YU 
SHISHI NANDIAN [CHINA URBAN HOUSING SYSTEM REFORM: GOAL, MODEL AND 
DIFFICULTIES] at 5 (1999) [hereinafter Cheng]. This book is one of the most comprehensive 
sources in Chinese language that collects scholarly writings on China’s public housing reform. 
According to this book, from 1958 to 1977, the state reduced housing investment substantially 
under the principle of “production first, housing second.”  
 28. Id.  
 29. The pressure brought by the population increase on the planned economy was 
enormous. This explains the reason that the Chinese government put forth the controversial 
“population control” policy. For detailed discussion on the correlation between China’s 
economic constraints and population growth, see generally Amy Hampton, Comment, 
Population Control in China: Sacrificing Human Rights for the Great Good? Birth Control 
Surgeries: 1971–1986, 11 TULSA J. COMP. & INT’L L. 321 (2003); Xizhe Peng, Population 
Policy and Program in China: Challenge and Prospective, 35 TEX. INT’L L.J. 51 (2000).  
 30. Id. In 1982, an estimated 1.89 million families with three generations shared space in 
flat units. 
 31. THE IMPACT OF CHINA’S ECONOMIC REFORMS UPON LAND, PROPERTY AND 
CONSTRUCTION 123 (Li Chen, Jean Jinghan & David Wills eds., 1999).  
 32. Id. at 122.  
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E. Housing Reform and Private Ownership 
The traditional housing distribution system was neither fair nor 
cost-efficient, and was stretched to the brink of bankruptcy. Soon 
after general economic reforms began, the central government 
contemplated an overhaul of the public housing system. After 
experimenting in several middle-sized cities, housing reform was 
gradually carried out across the nation in the mid-1980s. Generally, 
the aim of the reform was to privatize public housing.33 The 
privatization campaign, however, was not successful in the first phase 
of the reform. Despite prices being as low as one-third of 
construction costs, only a small number of workers were willing to 
purchase public housing. The failure of the reform was largely 
attributable to poorly defined property rights and the lack of a 
functional real estate market.  
As reform progressed, ambiguous property rights began to emerge 
as a major legal hurdle for property sales. The government was 
reluctant to award full ownership of the housing purchased during the 
reform. When residents considered buying public housing, their 
primary concern was whether they could actually “own” (right to 
occupy, to use, to profit, and to dispose of) their homes.34 For many, 
the appropriation of private property after liberation was a fresh 
memory. In the absence of explicit legal guarantees, it was difficult to 
convince workers to invest savings in purchasing homes. These 
concerns were not unreasonable. In the first phase of the reform, the 
practice of selling housing at a discounted price was largely 
curtailed.35 For example, according to the Yantai model rules, 
workers who purchased public housing at a discounted price were 
 
 33. For the development of housing reform, see YUN ZHIPING & BAI YIHONG, ZHONGGUO 
ZHUFANG ZHIDU GAIGE [CHIN HOUSING REFORM] (1990).  
 34. Cai pointed out that owners were more concerned about the right to dipose or profit 
than the right to use. He maintained that property ownership was the center of the reform. 
Without clearly defining property rights, it was impossible to set up the housing market. See 
CAI DERONG, ZHONGGUO CHENGZHEN ZHUFANG ZHIDU GAIGE YANJIU [STUDIES ON CHINA 
URBAN HOUSING REFORM] at 41–42 (1996).  
 35. ZHONGGUO SHEHUI KEXUE YUAN CAIMAO YANJIU SUO, MEIGUO NIUYUE 
GONGGONG GUANLI YANJIU SUO, [CHINA ACADEMY OF SOCIAL SCIENCE AND NEW YORK 
PUBLIC MANAGEMENT RESEARCH INSTITUTE], ZHONGGUO CHENGZHEN ZHUFAN ZHIDU GAIGE 
[CHINA URBAN HOUSING REFORM] 22 (1996).  
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only given the right to use and inherit it. They were not allowed to 
transfer, rent, give, or mortgage their homes. If it was necessary to 
sell, the housing was to be sold back to the original work unit at the 
purchase price less depreciation value.36 These promises did not 
generate adequate incentives for residents to invest in housing.  
The major rise in home sales came after the State Council issued 
The Decision on Deepening Urban Housing Reform in 1994.37 
According to the Decision, public housing was sold either at market 
price for high-income families or at prices based on construction 
costs for middle and low-income families. Workers who purchased 
housing at market price had full ownership of the housing, including 
the right to use, inherit, profit, and dispose of it. Workers who 
purchased housing at prices based on construction costs had limited 
ownership, which included the right to use and inherit and limited 
rights to profit from the housing. After five years from the purchase 
of a house based on the price of construction costs, the owner was 
allowed to sell it on the housing market as long as the land use fees 
and taxes were paid in full. Any proceeds from the sale were split 
between the owner and the work unit, which originally provided 
subsidies according to a predefined rate.38 In sum, the higher the price 
paid at the time of purchase, the broader the ownership awarded. 
Such provisions on ownership were fair and pragmatic. To some 
extent, the Decision was modeled after the British Housing Act of 
1981, which dealt with a similar situation in the process of privatizing 
public housing in the United Kingdom.39 
The results of the housing and land reforms were profound. Both 
private homeownership and per capita living space increased 
dramatically. By the end of 2002, more than 72% of residential 
housing was privately owned.40 By a different calculation, some 
 
 36. Guowuyan Guanyu Shenhua Chengzhen Zhufang Zhidu Gaige de Jueding [State 
Council Decision on Deepening Urban Housing Reform] (1994) [hereinafter Housing Reform 
Decision], ST. COUNCIL GAZ. at 133 (P.R.C.). Based on this important guideline, local 
governments issued implementing rules.  
 37. Id. at 119.  
 38. Articles 14-2, Housing Reform Decision. ST. COUNCIL GAZ. at 135–36. 
 39. See supra note 35, at 29.  
 40. Ruan, Zhongguo Chengzhen Jumin zhufang shuiping gaishan ren pingjun mianji chao 
22 pingmi [Urban Housing Improved, Space per Capita Reached 22 Square Meters]. 
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scholars speculated that the actual number could be as high as 
81.55% in 2004.41 The average living space per capita in urban areas 
increased more than six times, from 3.6 square meters in 1979 to 23.7 
square meters in 2003.42 Among all the provinces and large cities 
(excluding Hong Kong and Taiwan), Shanghai residents enjoyed the 
largest living space per capita, which reached 29.35 square meters by 
2003.43 According to the same survey, Beijing ranked third, with an 
average living space of 24.77 square meters.44  
F. Urban Land Ownership and Land Reform 
As it remains today, the Constitution provides that the State owns 
all urban land and agricultural collectives own all rural areas. The 
Constitution does not entitle individuals to own land. Given that the 
State and collectives own all land in China, individuals who 
purchased housing during the housing reform have no rights to own 
or transfer the land underneath their homes. Land reform, therefore, 
had a particular importance to the success of housing reform and 
parallel land reform efforts were initiated in the early 1980s.45  
The arrival of foreign investment, in conjunction with economic 
reform efforts, prompted land reform. To benefit from foreign 
investment, the State Council changed its traditional way of 
 
ZHONGGUO XIWEN SHE [CHINA NEWS], Aug. 1, 2003, available at http://www.people.com.cn/ 
GB/jingji/1038/1995500.html.  
 41. 2004 NIAN DICHAN NIANDU BAOGAO FABU [2004 REPORT ON REAL ESTATE MARKET 
RELEASED], available at http://www.people.com.cn/GB/jingji/1038/1995500.html. Based on 
his calculation, Liu pointed out the figure of private housing could have been much higher than 
what the annual report indicated.  
 42. Shehui baozhang baipi shu zi zhufang-ren pingjun zhufang mianji 23.7 pingmi [White 
Paper on Social Security-Housing: Space per Capita Reached 23.7 Square Meters], GUOJI 
JINRONG BAO [Int’l Fin. Daily], Sept. 9, 2004, available at http://news.sz.soufun.com/2004-09-
09/320208.htm.  
 43. Chen Xiaoping, Shanghai renjun zhufang mianji da 29.35 pingfang mi ju neidi 
shouwei [The Largest in the Nation: Space per Capita in Shanghai Reached 29.35 Square 
Meters], SHANGHAI QINGNIAN BAO [SHANGHAI YOUTH DAILY] Aug. 9, 2004, available at 
http://sh.house.sina.com.cn/2004-08-09/9828.html.  
 44. Xie Wei, Beijing renjun zhufang 24.77 pingfang mi neidi ju disan [Beijing Ranked 
Third; Its Housing per Capita Reached 24.77 Square Meters], XINJING BAO [NEW BEIJING 
DAILY], June 26, 2004, available at http://house.focus.cn/newshtml/68231.html.  
 45. Zhonghua Renmin Gonghe Guo Tudi Guanli Fa [Land Administration Law of the 
People’s Republic of China (LAL)], art. 5.  
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allocating lands to State-Owned Enterprises (“SOE”) based on need. 
In 1980, the State Council issued its first piece of legislation on land 
use rights, which heralded the dramatic changes of the land 
administration system in China.46 According to these Regulations, 
when Sino-foreign joint ventures applied for land, they were required 
to pay land use fees, regardless of whether the land was a new tract or 
an occupied tract that was already used by the Chinese partner. The 
fee included the cost of land surface readjustment, resettlement for 
laid-off workers, and other things such as easements and utilities. The 
land use fee could also be counted as a share of contribution from the 
Chinese partner to the joint venture. The land use rights were, 
however, not transferable.  
The initial changes were inspiring, but foreign investors soon 
discovered that the non-transferable land-use right was inconvenient 
for business transactions. Local governments also complained about 
the difficulties in monitoring individual businesses after land-use 
rights were granted. In addition, the non-transferable requirement was 
conducive to black-market activities. To encourage foreign 
investment, a 1988 amendment to the Constitution addressed these 
concerns. A clause was added to Article 10 of the Constitution 
recognizing the legitimacy of transferable land-use rights. Revised 
article 10 reads:47  
No organization or individual may appropriate, buy, sell or 
unlawfully transfer land in other ways. The right to the use of 
land may be transferred in according with law.  
After the constitutional hurdle was cleared, the State Council 
enacted the Interim Regulations Concerning the Assignment and 
Transfer of the Right to the Use of the State-owned Land in the 
Urban Areas, which set forth the scope and procedures for 
appropriating land-use rights and giving them to investors.48  
 
 46. Guanyu Zhongwai Heying Qiye Jianshe Yongdi de Zanxing Guiding [Interim 
Regulations on Construction Land Use for Sino-Foreign Joint Corporations (joint ventures)] 
(1980).  
 47. XIAN FA art. 10 (1988) (P.R.C.) (emphasis added). 
 48. Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Chengzhen Guoyou Tudi Shiyongquan Churang he 
Zhuanrang Zanxing Tiaoli [Interim Regulations of the People’s Republic of China Concerning 
Assignment and Transfer of the Right to the Use of the State-owned Land in the Urban Areas] 
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Based on the principles of separating land-use rights from land 
ownership, the law extended land-use rights to companies, 
enterprises, organizations, and individuals within the territory of 
China.49 This change meant, in addition to foreign investors, national 
economic entities and individuals were eligible to apply for land-use 
rights as well. Unlike previous laws, this law enabled land-use rights 
grantees to transfer, lease, and mortgage their rights within the 
duration provided by law.50  
As this law persists, land-use rights are granted for a certain 
period of time according to different types of uses: for residential use, 
70 years; for industrial use, 50 years; for Education, Science and 
Technology, Culture, Sports use, 40 years; and for commercial use, 
50 years.51 In general, the grantor (the state) does not have the right to 
reclaim the land-use right during the term of the grant; however, 
under special circumstances, such as public interest, the grantor may 
requisition the land-use rights through legal proceedings. If 
requisition occurs, the grantor must pay compensation based on the 
remaining time of the land-use right term and the grantee’s 
investment in the land.  
In sum, ideological changes eventually resulting in urban housing 
and land reforms provided residents legal standing to become real 
owners of their apartment homes. Yet, China’s homeowners still do 
not own the land underneath their apartments. They only have the 
right to use the land for up to 70 years.  
II. BULLDOZING HOMES TO DEVELOP THE ECONOMY  
Through housing reform, the government eagerly shifted the 
burden of providing housing from the state to individuals. Individual 
owners had indeed made substantial contributions to boost the 
 
(1990) [hereinafter ATLR]. The title of the law has been translated in several versions. The 
translation used in Randolph and Lou’s Chinese Real Estate Law is “Interim Provisions for the 
Granting and Transfer of Land Use Rights on State Owned Urban Land.” In order to keep the 
translation consistent with majority of works on land use rights in China, Beijing University 
Law School’s translation is used here.  
 49. ATLR art. 3.  
 50. ATLR art. 4.  
 51. ATLR art. 12.  
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housing industry. A few years later, however, commercial developers 
emerged as a major force for economic growth. In addition, local 
governments began to rely heavily on commercial developers to take 
on urban renewal preferred “image projects,” such as gigantic squares 
and skyscrapers. As a result, new homeowners found that they were 
no longer in the government’s favor. In the conflict between 
individual homeowners and deep-pocketed developers, the 
government has consistently sided with the latter.  
A. Commercial Developers vs. Private Homeowners 
Initially, economic development led to a rapid growth in urban 
population and expansion of urban construction projects. The 1990s 
witnessed large-scale housing construction projects aimed at 
improving old urban districts across the country.52 To make room for 
new developments, massive demolitions ensued. The demolition and 
relocation activities were chiefly managed and financed by the local 
governments. In Beijing, for example, the municipal government was 
responsible for the entire process of city reconstruction, from 
allocating funds, relocating residents, and setting compensation 
standards to providing resettlement housing. The initial purpose of 
demolition and relocation was to improve the living conditions of 
local residents.53 As a result, residents gladly waited for government 
action to demolish their shabby flats, because they knew that they 
would eventually be moved into larger and better apartment homes. 
The public praised the government for its policy on urban 
reconstruction.54 
Inevitably, however, the government’s funding of housing 
construction quickly dried up. During the economic reform, 
commercial developers stepped in to complete unfinished 
government projects after the state opened its land-use and housing 
markets. Toward the end of the 1990s, commercial developers played 
a prominent role in demolition and relocation activities. This change, 
 
 52. Zhao Ling, Chaiqian Shinian Beixi Ju [Happy Endings Became Tragedies over Ten 
Years] NANFANG ZHOUMO [Southern Weekend], Apr. 14, 2004.  
 53. Id.  
 54. Id.  
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however, came with a heavy price tag for urban residents. Due to the 
lack of uniform laws, policies on demolition and relocation favored 
developers over residents. In order to cut costs and maximize returns, 
commercial developers were reluctant to provide residents with 
compensation and relocation arrangements after demolishing old 
houses. In terms of setting compensation standards and authorizing 
forced evictions, residents began to see the government siding with 
developers. The tension between residents and developers became a 
source of dissatisfaction. Consequently, the public’s previously 
welcoming attitude became antagonistic towards demolition and 
relocation projects. In 1995, the Beijing government received a sharp 
increase of complaints filed by residents, whose houses were taken 
away without proper compensation.55 In February 2000, 10,375 
families together filed a class action lawsuit challenging the 
government’s decision to demolish and relocate their homes, a 
surprise to the government at the time.56  
B. The Chinese Takings Laws 
The tremendous harm inflicted on private owners can be traced 
directly to China’s fast economic development. The tension between 
residents and developers has seriously affected social stability. In 
order to strike a balance between economic development and private 
property protection, Chinese lawmakers passed several laws to 
regulate government takings: (1) Article 13 of the Constitution; (2) 
Regulations on Urban Housing Demolition and Relocations, 2001 
(Regulations); and (3) Urgent Notice on Diligently Carrying out 
Urban Housing Demolition and Relocation, and Maintaining Social 
Stability (“Notice”).57 Yet, despite the great importance that the 
 
 55. Id.  
 56. Id.  
 57. Guanyu Renzhen Zuohao Chengzheng Fangwu Chaiqian Gongzuo, Weihu Shehui 
Wending De Jinji Tongzhi [An Urgent Notice on Diligently Carrying out Urban Housing 
Demolition and Relocation, Maintaining Social Stability], (promulgated by the Office of the 
State Council, Sept. 19, 2003). Guo Ban Fa Ming Dian [2003] no. 42. Urgent Notice (Jinji 
Tongzhi) is a type of normative document, which has no legally binding effect. However, it can 
have huge impact on local governments in a time of crisis. For example, during the SARS 
epidemic in 2003, the state council issued several influential urgent notices urging local 
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central government attached to takings issues, the above laws and 
regulations have not been fully enforced to protect private property.  
C. Problems with the Chinese Takings Laws 
1. Public Purpose Over Broadly Construed58  
This research reveals that there is no single case in which a 
homeowner has even attempted to challenge the public purpose of a 
particular government project. No such case exists because “public 
interest” is an extremely elusive term in Chinese law, which in 
practice grants the government the absolute power to make decisions 
based on local leaders’ preferences. “Public interest” has been 
interpreted far beyond the scope of traditional for-public-use projects, 
such as highways, parks, or schools. It is not unusual for local 
governments to take private homes and hand them over to 
commercial developers under the guise of “public interest.” In reality, 
the government deems every action as being for a public purpose in 
China. Individual owners, therefore, simply do not have any cause of 
action to challenge the purpose of the project. The court, which is an 
integral part of the government, would not take such cases. Besides, 
very few lawyers are willing to accept cases challenging government 
decisions. In sum, there is no legal remedy when the government 
abuses the “public purpose” requirement in the takings law.  
Additionally, local leaders are under enormous pressure from the 
central government to keep local Gross Domestic Product (“GDP”) 
high, so that the overall economic growth stays on the fast track. 
Since local leaders are appointed by the government at a higher level, 
rather than elected by the local people, the local leaders clearly know 
that their political fates hinge on how well they can fulfill the wishes 
of higher officials. In recent years, the sole standard for evaluating a 
leader’s ability is local GDP. For example, as an implied rule in 
Shandong Province, less than a 17% GDP increase would not bode 
 
governments to take measures on prevention, control, and treatment of the disease. See 
generally CHENGLIN LIU, CHINESE LAW ON SARS (2004). 
 58. This section is based on and updates Chenglin Liu, Informal Rules, Transaction Costs, 
and the Failure of the Chinese “Takings” Law, 29 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV 1, 6–15 
(2005).  
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well for a local leader’s political future.59 The frantic pursuit of high 
GDP has resulted in many so-called “image” or “legacy” projects, by 
which leaders score high political credits needed for reappointment or 
promotion. Therefore, gigantic shopping malls, industrial parks, and 
skyscrapers, among others, are on the top agenda of new leaders.  
During their five-year tenure, local leaders make every effort to 
achieve high economic growth. The most efficient way to develop the 
economy is to sell the land-use rights of the best location in town to 
foreign or domestic commercial developers. Due to historical 
reasons, the best locations with utility lines and easy access to 
transportation are usually condensed residential neighborhoods. In 
order to clear the way for commercial developers, local leaders first 
emphasize that the commercial development is for the local economy, 
and thus for public use. For the “bright future of the city,” the leaders 
ask all residents affected by the project to make sacrifices by moving 
out in a timely fashion, accepting low compensation standards, and 
being willing to relocate to remote suburban areas. In cases of 
resistance, the leaders do not hesitate to authorize a forced eviction 
order to make room for economic development. Under the guise of 
“public purpose,” local leaders utilize all powers at their disposal to 
facilitate commercial development.  
Effective zoning laws could restrict local leaders from engaging in 
wasteful “image” or “legacy” projects. In practice, however, China’s 
Urban Zoning Law is powerless because the People’s Congress is not 
an independent co-equal branch that can enforce meaningful 
supervision over government decisions. Despite its increasing status 
in recent years, the People’s Congress is still very weak in relation to 
the government. It is still beholden to the government for budget, 
essential supplies, and more importantly, appointments for key posts 
in the Congress. It is not uncommon for a government official, whose 
continuous appointment as a governor is barred by law,60 to assume 
the key position in the Congress. As a result, there is no single case in 
 
 59. Li Ming, Shandong geshi zhuiqiu GDP gaosu zengzhang cheng diyu 17% nabuchu 
shou [Cities in Shandong Province in a Hot Pursuit of High Economic Growth: Less than a 
17% Increase in GDP is Not Enough], Diyi Caijing Ribao [FIRST FINANCE DAILY] (July 31, 
2006). 
 60. The tenure of government officials is five years.  
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which a local People’s Congress rejected the government’s zoning 
plan or made substantial changes to it.  
The second reason for failure to observe the Zoning Law is that 
the tremendous income from land sales accounts for a substantial part 
of local revenue. The national land sale income in 2006 reached 700 
billion Yuan (U.S. $10 billion).61 Unlike tax revenue, the land sale 
income is not subject to budgetary supervision.62 Land sales, 
therefore, have become the hottest way for local governments to 
make a profit.63 Mr. Cangchun Gan, the head of legal department of 
the State Land Ministry, once referred to land sale income as 
“Mayor’s pocket money,” because it can be used at local leaders’ will 
without effective restraints.64 No city is willing to lose a competitive 
edge by imposing any zoning restriction on its ability to profit from 
land use right sales. Zoning Law is completely irrelevant when 
leaders make their decisions as to which tract to sell and for what 
purpose the land will eventually be put to use, where the sale will 
increase the local government’s profit.65  
2. Compensation Issues66 
As discussed above, there is no room to challenge the public 
purpose of a particular project; therefore, the private owners whose 
homes have been condemned for economic development are left with 
no choice but to hope for fair compensation. These innocent hopes, 
however, are often dashed. Inadequate compensation has become the 
major source of confrontation between private owners and developers 
backed by local governments. Despite strict regulations on official 
media, national news outlets have reported some tragic protests 
against low compensation standards from time to time. In August 
 
 61. Zhi Ling, Tudi Churang Jing Cheng Difang Zhengfu “Zuire” Chuangshou Xiangmu 
[Land Use Right Sale has Become the “Hottest” Item for Local Governments to Make Profit], 
ZHONGGUO QINGNIAN BAO [CHINA YOUTH DAILY], Aug. 3, 2007. 
 62. Id.  
 63. Id.   64. Luo Tao, Guotu Bu: Tudi Shouyi Buneng Chengwei Shizhang “Linghuaqian” [The 
Ministry of State Land: Land Sale Income Should Not Become Mayor’s Pocket Money], JINGJI 
CANKAO BAO [ECONOMIC INFORMATION DAILY], Sept. 12, 2006. 
 65. Id.  
 66. See supra note 58. 
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2003, Biao Weng poured gasoline on himself and set himself on fire 
at the local demolition and relocation office that had forcefully 
evicted his family and demolished his home without proper 
compensation; Mr. Weng burned to death.67 On September 15, 2003, 
Zhengliang Zhu set himself on fire in the Tiananmen Square in 
Beijing protesting the government taking of his house without 
adequate compensation; Mr. Zhu was severely burned.68 On 
September 14, 2006, Shulan Xie drank a bottle of pesticide in protest 
of the low compensation for her house taken for the Hunan 
Agricultural University campus expansion project.69  
Having realized the serious social consequences resulting from 
inadequate compensation, the central government has repeatedly 
issued notices or regulations demanding that local governments 
increase compensation standards. In 2003, the Ministry of 
Construction issued the Guiding Opinions on the Appraisal of Urban 
Housing Demolitions (“Guiding Opinions”).70 According to the 
Guiding Opinions, compensation for urban housing taken for 
economic development purposes must be based on market value. It is 
difficult, however, for the affected residents to find accurate market 
information given the immaturity of the Chinese real estate market. 
Acting upon developers’ request, local governments often take 
advantage of information deficiency and deliberately set a low 
compensation standard in order to cut development costs. Backed by 
the government, the developers often find various excuses to deny 
private owners’ legitimate demand for compensation, as soon as the 
demolition and relocation order is issued. Despite the law’s 
requirement that developers set aside funds for compensation and 
 
 67. Wang Cijiang & Chengshi Chaiqian, Sifa Heyi Quewai [Urban Demolition: Lack of 
Law and Order], CHINA NET, Sept. 22, 2003, available at www.china.org.cn/chinese/law/ 
408670.htm. 
 68. Yan Xiaomei, Anhui Qingyang Xian Nongmin Zhu Zhengliang Zai Tiananmen Zifen 
Diaocha [Report on Mr. Zhu’s Immolation in the Tiananmen Square], DONGFANG ZAO BAO 
[EAST MORNING NEWS], Sept. 18, 2003.  
 69. Cao Cang, Hunan nongda chaiqian jiufen diaocha: zhigong fudu qianren juji [An 
Investigation of the Hunan Agricultural Demolition Incident: A Worker Swallowed Pesticide in 
Protest and Thousands Took the Street], ZHONGGUO JINJI ZHOUKAN [China Econ. Weekly], 
Nov. 13, 2006, available at http://edu.people.com.cn/GB/5029855.html.  
 70. Chengshi Fangwu Chaiqian Gujia Zhidao Yijian, 2003 [THE GUIDING OPINIONS ON 
THE APPRAISAL OF URBAN HOUSING DEMOLITIONS OF 2003], available at http://news. 
xinhuanet.com/zhengfu/2003-12/03/content_1211069.htm  
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resettlement, very few developers are willing to do so due to lack of 
an enforcement mechanism.  
Another problem with compensation is that property owners are 
often taken advantage of in the complicated relocation arrangements. 
According to the Regulations, private owners have a choice of being 
compensated with lump sum money or with a new property of the 
same size at a similar location.71 Since the compensation standards 
are usually low and not enough for property owners to buy 
comparable housing, many owners choose to be compensated with a 
new property. The Regulations also provide that if the new property 
is larger than the condemned housing (which usually is the case), the 
owners need to pay the difference.72 The rules seem to be fair to both 
sides, but developers have their own way to manipulate the rules.  
In order to persuade property owners to accept relocation 
packages and vacate the proposed site quickly, some developers 
promise much larger property as compensation and offer a very 
preferable price for the difference that owners need to pay. As a 
result, property owners gladly accept the offer and sign the relocation 
and compensation agreements with developers. While waiting for 
completion of the project, property owners either find temporary 
housing by themselves with allowances paid by the developers or live 
in transit housing provided by the developers. The time to complete a 
project, however, can take several years or even a decade. By the 
time that relocation housing is ready, project management has 
changed hands several times. By law, the new developer is required 
to honor all the agreements between the initial developer and 
residents.73 In practice, however, there are cases where the 
subsequent developers set various hurdles that prevent property 
owners from moving into their long awaited houses without paying 
large additional amounts of money. In some cases, the developer puts 
the relocation housing on sale at current market price.74  
 
 71. The Regulations, art. 23-25.  
 72. Id. art. 25.  
 73. Jing Xiaofeng, Chaiqian hu 11 nian deng budao hetong yueding huiqianfang 
gongzheng hetong cheng kongwen [Property Owner Could Not Move to Relocation Housing 
After 11 Years, Notarized Contract is Not Honored], NANGUO ZHAOBAO [SOUTH CHINA 
MORNING NEWS], Apr. 30, 2007. 
 74. See infra Part II.C.3.  
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3. Forced Eviction and Due Process of Law75 
According to the Regulations, the Demolition Bureau is the only 
entity that arbitrates disputes between residents and developers with 
regard to compensation and resettlement. No resident trusts 
Demolition Bureau as an impartial arbitrator, because it has already 
approved the compensation standard and resettlement plan when 
granting the demolition license to the developer. It is unlikely that the 
Demolition Bureau would rule against its own decision in the 
arbitration. In addition, as a regular government division, it is 
impossible for the Demolition Bureau to be immune from external 
influence, especially from officials who have close ties to developers. 
According to a 2001 survey of five cities, conducted by Professor 
Wang, the chance for a resident to win arbitration from Demolition 
Bureau was only 0.03%.76 
For residents, the consequence of losing in Demolition Bureau 
arbitration is disastrous. It means that they have to face an immediate 
forced eviction either by the developer authorized by the Demolition 
Bureau, or by judicial force. According to Article 16(2) of the 
Regulations, residents may appeal an unsatisfactory decision to the 
People’s court; however, the Demolition Bureau’s decision remains 
enforceable while the case is pending before the court.77 This means 
that even if residents win their case in court, their only remedy is 
monetary damages. Injunctive relief has never been an option. 
Forced eviction is often referred to as “savage eviction” or 
“violent eviction” by Chinese scholars.78 Cutting off water and 
electricity, verbally threatening residents, physically assaulting 
residents, and sending thugs to break into homes are among the 
various means frequently utilized by condemners to drive residents 
 
 75. See supra note 58. 
 76. WANG CAILIANG, FANGWU CHAIQIAN JIUFEN JIAODIAN SHIYI [GUIDE TO SOLVING 
DISPUTES OVER URBAN HOUSING DEMOLITION] 99 (2004) Only one in thirty-seven won the 
arbitral decision from the Demolition Bureau.  
 77. The Regulations, art. 16(1).  
 78. For example, Wang Cailiang criticized violent eviction in his book. See generally 
supra note 76.  
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away from their homes. Mr. Howard W. French, a New York Times 
reporter, made this observation79: 
Stories are legion in Chinese cities of the arrest or even beating 
of people who protest too vigorously against their eviction and 
relocation. In one often-heard twist, holdouts are summoned to 
the local police station and return home only to find their 
house already demolished.  
Mr. French’s description only catches a few glimpses of what has 
happened during a demolition process in China. There are even worse 
cases than what he depicted above. Shanghai is the window of 
China’s modernity, but few are aware of how much ordinary private 
owners have paid for the development. On January 9, 2005, Yang 
Sunqin, the Deputy CEO of Shanghai Chengkai Co., directed two 
staff, Wang and Lu, to set fire to Mr. Zhu’s home in order to evict the 
family. The fire quickly consumed the building, in which Zhu’s elder 
parents were burned to death. Zhu and other family members fled 
from an attic window and survived. Embarrassed by the incident, the 
government of Shanghai pledged to conduct a full investigation.80 
Three suspects were soon arrested. In August 2005, the deputy CEO 
and one staff were sentenced to death with a two-year suspension. 
The other staff member was sentenced to life imprisonment.81 Mr. 
Liu Yungeng, Deputy Secretary of Shanghai Municipality admitted 
during a news conference that the conflicts between developers and 
homeowners were the major source of social discontent. Mr. Liu 
listed the horrendous means the developers used to force out 
homeowners, including taking away stairways at night, smashing 
doors and windows, and cutting off water and other utility lines.82  
 
 79. Howard W French, A Chinese Homeowner Stands Her Ground, INT’L HERALD TRIB., 
Mar. 27, 2007, at 2.  
 80. Fu Jianfeng, Shanghai “juqianhu” bei dichan shan zonghuo shaoshi shijian de beihou 
[An In-Depth Investigation of the Incident in which Two were Burned to Death by Real Estate 
Developers], NANFANG DUSHI BAO [SOUTHERN METRO NEWS], Mar. 3, 2005.  
 81. Dai Wei & Tian Qilin, Shanghai zonghuo biqian an tuxian chaiqian heimu [Forced 
Eviction with Fire Reveals the Dark Side of Demolition and Relocation Activities], CAI JING 
[CAIJING MAGAZINE], Sept. 19, 2005. 
 82. Li Rong, Shanghai jianjue daji dong chaiqian zhong sunhai qunzhong liyi de weifa 
xingwei [Shanghai Determinedly Cracks Down on Illegal Demolition that Encroaches upon 
Residents’ Property Right], XINHUA NET, Feb. 3, 2005. 
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The practice of forcing residents out by all means is likely to 
continue because the profits from the demolition projects outweigh 
all conceivable legal consequences.  
III. COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE  
Economic development and large-scale takings sometimes go 
hand in hand. China is not alone in facing the tension between 
protection of private property and the need to make room for further 
economic growth. Whether it be a developing or developed economy, 
government takings are inevitable at various stages of economic 
development, as long as private ownership is recognized as a 
legitimate right. The ways of carrying out takings, however, vary 
greatly in different jurisdictions. The following section provides a 
comparative analysis of how takings laws in the United States and 
Singapore offer some potentially useful perspectives for legal 
scholars as well as the Chinese lawmakers.  
A. United States  
1. Public Purpose: From a Narrow View to a Broad View  
Eminent domain is used to take land for a “public use,” but what 
constitutes a public use? In the United States, it is very difficult to 
define “public use” in a precise and fixed form.83 The concept of 
“public use” has been interpreted differently over time in the United 
States.  
In colonial times, the taking of private property for public use 
through the power of eminent domain was not controversial. The 
concept of “public use” was, however, the subject of heated debates 
as the government played an increasing role in facilitating 
commercial development.84 For a century (1830-1930), the debates 
involved two opposing points of view on how to construe “public 
use”: the narrow view and the broad view.85 The narrow view held 
 
 83. Nichols, supra note 35, § 7.02[1].  
 84. Id. § 7.01[3]. 
 85. RICHARD R. POWELL, POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY 79F.03[3][a] [hereinafter 
POWELL]. 
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that private property taken through eminent domain must provide its 
intended use to the public.86 “The public must be entitled, as of right, 
to use or enjoy the property.”87 The broad view maintained that 
“public use” included not only uses that were directly beneficial to 
the public, such as roads, but also uses to promote the general welfare 
and prosperity of the whole community.88 Early judicial decisions 
embraced both approaches, which rendered the eminent domain 
doctrine inconsistent and unpredictable.89  
In the 1910s, the U.S. Supreme Court began to reject the narrow 
view in favor of the broad view, when it found the former to be an 
“unacceptable tool” in analyzing takings cases.90 Further, the Court 
became increasingly deferential to Congress’s decision to utilize the 
power of eminent domain for “public use.”91 This trend was reflected 
in a 1954 Supreme Court case, Berman v. Parker.92 In Berman, a 
redevelopment project called for the appropriation of certain private 
properties in accordance with a Congressional act. A private owner, 
whose department store was in the condemnation area, challenged the 
constitutionality of the act and sought to enjoin the condemnation. 
The owner argued that the condemnation was not for public use and 
violated his property rights because the government intended to 
transfer the condemned property to another private owner. The Court, 
after expressing its deference to the legislature,93 upheld the 
constitutionality of the act and confirmed the government’s right to 
condemn the property, provided that the owner received just 
compensation.94  
In 1984, the Supreme Court once again demonstrated the “broad 
view” approach and its deference to the legislature in another leading 
 
 86. Id. 
 87. Id. 
 88. Id. 
 89. Id. at 79F-28. See also Berger, The Public Use Requirement in Eminent Domain, 57 
OR. L. REV. 203, 209 (1978). 
 90. POWELL, supra note 85, 79F.03[3][b] at 79F-29.  
 91. Id.  
 92. Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954).  
 93. See id. at 32. “Subject to specific constitutional limitations, when the legislature has 
spoken, the public interest has been declared in terms well-nigh conclusive. In such cases, the 
legislature, not the judiciary, is the main guardian of the public needs to be served by social 
legislation.”  
 94. Id.  
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case, Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff.95 At issue in this case was 
the constitutionality of the Hawaii Land Reform Act of 1967 (the 
“Act”). Under the Act, lessees living on single-family residential lots 
owned by private landowners were entitled to ask the Hawaii 
Housing Authority (“HHA”) to condemn the property on which they 
lived. The Act was enacted to reduce the over-concentrated land 
ownership in Hawaii. Pursuant to the Act, the HHA conducted a 
public hearing and found that condemnation would affect the public 
purpose.96 The landowners filed a lawsuit alleging the Act violated 
the public use clause of the Fifth Amendment because the condemned 
lands were taken from one private owner and handed over to another. 
Citing Berman v. Parker, the Supreme Court restated its deference to 
the local legislature stating, “The ‘public use’ requirement is thus 
conterminous with the scope of a sovereign’s police power.”97 The 
Court then pushed the scope of “public use” even further by stating 
that the mere taking of property from one private owner and giving it 
to another does not “condemn that taking as only a private 
purpose.”98 “[I]t is only the taking’s purpose, and not its mechanics, 
that must pass scrutiny under the Public Use Clause.”99 The Court 
found that the Act was constitutional, because it was enacted to 
“reduce perceived social and economic evils” caused by the over-
concentrated ownership in the Hawaii real estate market.100 
The broad view has also found support in State courts.101 State 
governments are not immune from the influence of commercial 
developers and interest groups.102 To revitalize local economies, add 
jobs, and collect taxes,103 some states have stretched the broad view 
 
 95. Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229 (1984).  
 96. Id.  
 97. Id. at 240.  
 98. Id. at 244.  
 99. Id.  
 100. Id. at 241–42.  
 101. POWELL, supra note 85, 79F.03[3][c], at 79F-32.  
 102. Steven M. Simpson, Judicial Abdication and the Rise of Special Interests, 6 CHAP. L. 
REV. 197, 199 (2003). 
 103. For example, section 2 of the [Michigan] Planning, Housing, And Zoning Economic 
Development Corporations Act provides:  
 There exists in this state the continuing need for programs to alleviate and prevent 
conditions of unemployment, and the legislature finds that it is accordingly necessary 
to assist and retain local industrial and commercial enterprises . . . it is also necessary 
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to the extreme. In Poletown Neighborhood Council v. City of 
Detroit,104 the Detroit Economic Development Corporation 
condemned a low-income Polish neighborhood consisting of private 
homes, churches, and businesses and transferred the tract of land to 
General Motors (“GM”) for use in an assembly plant. The 
neighborhood association and several residents in the affected area 
brought a lawsuit challenging the constitutionality of using the power 
of eminent domain to condemn private property to boost the 
economy. The residents argued that this taking was for private use 
instead of public use, despite the incidental benefit GM may bring to 
the public. The Michigan Supreme Court paid similar deference to 
the legislature as the U.S. Supreme Court did in Berman v. Parker. 
The Michigan court found that the legislature was better suited to 
decide whether the use of eminent domain met a public need.105 Over 
two vigorous dissents, the court upheld the validity of the 
condemnation. Even though legal scholars heavily criticized the 
Poletown decision,106 the precedent stood for over two decades, 
during which eleven cases followed Poletown. The controversial case 
was finally overruled by the same court in a 2004 case, County of 
Wayne v. Hathcock,107 where private owners successfully blocked the 
 
to encourage the location and expansion of industrial and commercial enterprises, 
including employee-owned corporations, to more conveniently provide needed 
services and facilities of the industrial and commercial enterprises to municipalities 
and the residents of the municipalities. . . . Therefore, the powers granted in this act 
constitute the performance of essential public purposes and functions for this state and 
its municipalities.  
MCLS § 125.1602 (2004) (emphasis added). To further the objectives of this act, the legislature 
has authorized municipalities to acquire property by condemnation in order to provide industrial 
and commercial sites and the means of transfer from the municipality to private users. Sec. 22 
of the above act provides:  
A municipality may take private property . . . for the purpose of transfer to the 
corporation, and may transfer the property to the corporation for use in an approved 
project, on terms and conditions it deems appropriate, and the taking, transfer, and use 
shall be considered necessary for public purposes and for the benefit of the public. 
MCLS § 125.1622 (2004) (emphasis added). 
 104. Poletown Neighborhood Council v. City of Detroit, 304 N.W.2d 455 (Mich. 1981).  
 105. Id. at 458.  
 106. See Timothy Sandefur, A Gleeful Obituary for Poletown Neighborhood Council v. 
Detroit, 28 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 651 (2005). 
 107. County of Wayne v. Hathcock, 684 N.W.2d 765 (Mich. 2004). 
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city’s decision to condemn private lands for developing a 
technological park.  
2. The Kelo Decision 
After Midkiff, the Supreme Court did not revisit its view on the 
scope of “public use” for two decades until Kelo v. City of New 
London108 was brought before the Court in 2005. The central issue in 
Kelo was whether economic development fell within the scope of 
“pubic use.” Unlike the Midkiff court, which unanimously held for 
the government, the Kelo court was sharply divided. In a five to four 
decision, the Court upheld the “broad view” approach established in 
Berman and Midkiff.  
The City of New London is located at the junction of the Thames 
River and Long Island.109 Despite its superb location, the City’s 
economy was in decline for several decades. In 1998, the City’s 
unemployment rate was nearly double that of the state and its 
population reached a record low. To revitalize the City’s economy, 
the State authorized the New London Development Corporation 
(NLDC), a private nonprofit entity, to draw up redevelopment plans. 
The State issued multi-million dollar bonds in support of the NLDC’s 
planning activities to create Fort Trumbull State Park. At the same 
time, Pfizer Inc. announced its plan to build a $300 million research 
facility in the vicinity of the State Park.110 Both the City and the State 
saw Pfizer’s project as a catalyst to the area’s rejuvenation. In order 
to facilitate Pfizer’s investment and other commercial opportunities 
in anticipation of Pfizer’s arrival, the NLDC finalized an integrated 
development plan. The plan required ninety acres of the Fort 
Trumbull area to be condemned for the project. Petitioners owned 
properties within the Fort Trumbull area.111  
The petitioners raised several arguments. First, they argued that 
the Court should adopt a new bright-line rule that disqualified 
economic development as “public use.”112 The Court rejected the 
 
 108. Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005).  
 109. Id. at 473.  
 110. Id.  
 111. Id.  
 112. Id. at 484.  
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petitioners’ claim by reaffirming the pivotal role of the government in 
revitalizing the local economy. The Court held that promoting 
economic development is a traditional government function.113 After 
drawing comparisons to Berman, Midkiff and other cases, the Court 
concluded that Kelo was indistinguishable from previous cases. It 
held that “there [was] no basis for exempting economic development 
from our traditionally broad understanding of public purpose.”114 In 
the decision, Justice Stevens emphasized that the development plan 
was “carefully considered,” and there was no evidence of an 
illegitimate purpose.115  
Then the Petitioners argued that using eminent domain for 
economic development blurred the boundary between public and 
private takings.116 Citing Midkiff and Berman, the Court reasoned that 
government redevelopment projects would often benefit individual 
private parties whether the projects were carried out by the 
government itself or by private entities.117 The Court held that “[t]he 
public end may be as well or better served through an agency of 
private enterprise than through a department of government.”118 
Finally, the petitioners argued that the court should require a 
“reasonable certainty” that the expected public use would actually 
succeed.119 The Court reiterated its long held deferential approach 
and declined to second-guess the efficacy of the NLDC’s well-
thought redevelopment plan.120 It also declined to consider how the 
NLDC would eventually use the condemned property.121  
The Kelo decision has drawn enormous criticism. Justice 
O’Connor, joined by the Chief Justice, and Justices Scalia and 
Thomas, raised vigorous objection to the majority of the Court. In her 
dissenting opinion, O’Connor accused the Court of abandoning its 
“long held, basic limitation on government power.”122 She warned of 
 
 113. Id.  
 114. Kelo, 545 U.S. at 485. 
 115. Id. at 484–85. 
 116. Id. at 485.  
 117. Id.  
 118. Id. at 486.  
 119. Id. at 487.  
 120. Kelo, 545 U.S. at 488.  
 121. Id. at 489.  
 122. Id. at 494.  
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the serious consequences if the Court failed to exercise its necessary 
judicial check when one takes property from A and gives it to B:  
Under the banner of economic development, all private 
property is now vulnerable to being taken and transferred to 
another private owner, so long as it might be upgraded—i.e., 
given to an owner who will use it in a way that the legislature 
deems more beneficial to the public—in process.123 
O’Connor further pointed out that the Kelo decision made private 
and public use indistinguishable, because it qualified economic 
development takings as “public use,” as long as there were any 
incidental public benefits from subsequent ordinary use of private 
property.124 In O’Connor’s view, the decision rendered the words “for 
pubic use” meaningless under the Takings Clause of the Fifth 
Amendment.125  
Given the heated debate that the Kelo decision brought to legal 
scholars, by no means does it stand as the last word on U.S. 
jurisprudence regarding eminent domain. As Professor Burke 
observed, while the Supreme Court refused to interfere with the 
City’s judgment, it “explicitly reminded the states of their potentially 
more expansive role in the protection of private property rights. In 
essence, the Court said to the states that this decision was a matter of 
policy and that in addressing this policy question, legislatures should 
consider their constituents' outrage as a part of the democratic 
process. Such consideration is not within the purview of the 
courts.”126  
The Kelo decision immediately triggered a nationwide backlash 
from state legislatures. Alabama became the first state to enact new 
law against local-government seizure of property.127 In an elaborate 
signing ceremony, Governor Riley touted the new bill, stating, “A 
property rights revolt is sweeping the nation, and Alabama is leading 
 
 123. Id.  
 124. Id.  
 125. Id.  
 126. Marcilynn A. Burke, Much Ado About Nothing: Kelo v. City of New London, Babbitt 
v. Sweet Home, and Other Tales from the Supreme Court, 75 U. CIN. L. REV. 663, 683 (2006.) 
 127. Donald Lambro, Alabama Limits Eminent Domain, WASH. TIMES, Aug. 4, 2005, at 
A1. 
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it.”128 With the new state bill, “Alabamians can rest assured that their 
homes, farms, business and other private property are safe from being 
seized by government for a shopping center, or a factory, an office 
building or new residential development.”129 Following the suit, 
thirty-four states enacted legislation or passed ballot measures during 
2005 and 2006 in response to the Kelo decision. The remaining 
sixteen states, along with others that had previously passed laws, 
considered bills in 2007.130 While it remains unclear whether any of 
these provisions will significantly narrow the power of eminent 
domain in the U.S. post-Kelo, the fact that state governments can 
restrain the broad federal approach provides a key difference in its 
purported support of the takings law in China. 
3. The Kelo Debate in China 
American scholars may be surprised that the Kelo decision 
received enormous fanfare from the Chinese media. Some scholars 
claimed that the protection of property under the U.S. Constitution 
was all but an empty promise.131 A few weeks after the decision, the 
China Real Estate News, the official newspaper of the Chinese 
Construction Ministry, published a long article about the Kelo case.132 
Land Bureaus in major cities, which have been plagued with a 
takings problem, posted a Chinese translation of the Kelo decision on 
their websites with the subtitle, “Kelo v. New London: How the U.S. 
Supreme Court deals with economic takings.”133 The purpose of 
making the Kelo decision available from the Chinese governmental 
agency’s news outlet was obvious: (1) it implied that the United 
States was no better than China in protecting private property; and (2) 
 
 128.  Id.  
 129.  Id.  
 130. http://www.ncsl.org/programs/natres/EMINDOMAIN.htm  
 131. REN DONGLEI, MEIGUO DE CHAIQIAN ZHENGDI GUANSI [THE EMINENT DOMAIN CASE 
IN THE UNITED STATES] http://www.tecn.cn/data/detail.php?id=7455. 
 132. Zhong Yuan, Guojia zhengyong de falu yubo [The Shockwave of Government 
Takings], CHINA REAL ESTATE NEWS, July 18, 2005.  
 133. Cong Fei Tian, “Kailuo su xin lundun shi an” Jiedu meiguo zhengfu ruhe jiejue 
zhengdi zhengyi [Interpreting U.S. Takings Law from the Kelo Case], ZHONGGUO FANGDICHAN 
BAO [CHINA REAL ESTATE NEWS], Dec. 12, 2005.  
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takings for economic development was not only justified in China, 
but also in the U.S. 
The debate about the Kelo case among Chinese scholars has been 
valuable and healthy. These scholars, however, seem to miss one 
crucial point—why the U.S. Supreme Court took its deferential 
approach, that is, let the New London Legislature decide the purpose 
of the takings. In the Kelo decision, Justice Stevens emphasized that 
the development plan was “carefully considered,” and there was no 
evidence of an illegitimate purpose. To a large extent, the Court 
relied on the judgment of the local government, which was duly 
elected and its decision was approved by the local legislature.  
In China, however, the local government is not elected by the 
people, but appointed by officials at a higher level of government. 
Consequently, local leaders are accountable to governments at a 
higher level, and not to the local people. When the central 
government sets a goal for rapid economic growth, local leaders 
accomplish the goal by all means, with little consideration for 
subsequent costs of such development plans. Local development 
plans are often made in haste and in secret, without consultation with 
the local people. In theory, the local People’s Congress should have 
the power to make the final decision on development plans. In 
practice, however, the Congress is not independent from the central 
government. There is not a single case where the Congress has 
disapproved a government proposal.  
At an ideological level, private property is treated differently in 
the U.S. than in China. In the United Sates, the origins of property 
can be traced back to several schools of thought: natural rights, 
personal protections, and economic utility.134 The natural right theory 
stems from John Locke’s writings, which were very influential in 
early America. His works are still widely studied and cited by many 
scholars. According to Locke, property is a natural endowment that 
every member of a society deserves to have. The right to property is a 
pre-social or pre-legal right coming from God. Like the rights to life 
and liberty, the right to property should not be subject to restriction 
 
 134. See generally 2-5 NICHOLS ON EMINENT DOMAIN § 5.01 (1997).  
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by the state. The goal of a civil society is the protection of property 
rights.135 
The second school of thought asserts that it is vital to protect 
property rights because they are closely connected with personal 
rights. Without property rights, other rights are not possible. In a 
widely cited passage, Justice Stewart depicts the correlations of 
property rights and other fundamental rights:  
[T]he dichotomy between personal liberties and property rights 
is a false one. Property does not have rights. People have 
rights. The right to enjoy property without unlawful 
deprivation, no less than the right to speak or the right to 
travel, is in truth a “personal” right, whether the “property” in 
question be a welfare check, a home, or a savings account. In 
fact, a fundamental interdependence exists between the 
personal right to liberty and the personal right in property. 
Neither could have meaning without the other. That rights in 
property are basic civil rights has long been recognized.136 
This school of thought advocates strong property rights protection. 
If property rights can be arbitrarily changed, other rights will be in 
jeopardy.  
The third school of thought emphasizes the economic utility 
aspect of property rights. As Posner points out, “legal protection of 
property rights creates incentives to exploit resources efficiently.”137 
The protection of property rights is a practical means to achieve 
economic prosperity, rather than the ultimate goal of a society. When 
the government believes that property owners stand in the way of 
economic development, it will change the existing rules to assign 
valuable resources to the presumed efficient users. A typical example 
is exercising the power of eminent domain to facilitate economic 
development. This school of thought does not invariably support 
strong property rights.  
Each school of thought has merit. No single school is a dominant 
theory that is universally accepted by American scholars. Instead, the 
 
 135. 2-5 NICHOLS ON EMINENT DOMAIN § 5.01 [3][a]i (1997).  
 136. Lynch v. Household Finance, 405 U.S. 538, 552 (1972).  
 137. RICHARD POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 32 (6th ed. 2003).  
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combination of these intellectual traditions has played an important 
role in shaping the current American jurisprudence of property law.  
In China, the economic utility theory underlies current property 
reforms. This theory persists because the reforms are largely driven 
by the economic need to foster private property rights, rather than the 
desire to protect individual freedoms. After several decades of 
communist rule, it is difficult for China to eradicate a deep-rooted 
ideology, which holds that the state is the only source of individual 
rights. Neither the ears of the public nor of the intellectuals are 
sensitive to natural rights theory. Further, the theory linking personal 
protections and property rights does not appeal to top decision 
makers, because they focus more on social stability than individual 
freedom. Naturally, the economic utility theory finds a large audience 
among Chinese decision-makers as well as scholars, who strive to 
find a well-crafted theory to justify the means for economic growth. 
Locke’s theory is rarely mentioned, let alone having an influence in 
the lawmaking process.  
B. Singapore  
By turning a sleepy fishing village into an attractive international 
metropolitan area in a span of three decades, Singapore has 
impressed the world with its superb economic performance. 
Singapore has become a model for many Asian countries striving for 
modernity and prosperity. As a result, a great deal of literature has 
been devoted to finding the causes of this economic miracle. Very 
few scholars, however, have examined the mixed impact of the 
Singaporean takings law on the economic development and social 
justice of the country. The problems that Singapore faced in the 
1960s bear striking resemblance to what the Chinese government is 
facing today. With over 75% of the population being ethnic Chinese, 
Singapore shares a similar culture and tradition with China. Despite 
the differences in state structure and legal systems, the two nations 
have taken similar paternalistic measures to maintain social order, 
including public housing and compulsory land acquisition. (In the 
1970s, Singapore even imposed strict family planning in order to 
relieve the pressure on the housing supply resulting from rapid 
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population growth.) A study of Singaporean takings law, therefore, 
offers unique lessons for China.  
1. Public Purpose  
The Japanese occupation in the 1940s left Singapore’s economy in 
a devastated condition. When the People’s Action Party (“PAP”) 
assumed power in 1959, it faced the enormous challenge of 
rebuilding Singapore from ruins. In order to maintain political power, 
the PAP focused on practical ways to improve its citizens’ standard 
of living. The PAP made public housing a top priority, because it 
viewed housing as “a crucial ingredient to immediate and lasting 
success.”138 To fulfill this campaign promise, the PAP laid out a 
master plan to redevelop Singapore, which required large-scale land 
acquisition.139 
The major legal hurdle for land acquisition was the constitutional 
guarantee that prevented the government from taking private land 
without paying just compensation. Before 1965, the Malaysian 
Constitution applied to Singapore. Article 13 of the Malaysian 
Constitution provided:  
(1) No person shall be deprived of property save in accordance 
with the law;  
(2) No law shall provide for the compulsory acquisition or use 
of property without adequate compensation.140  
In most democratic countries, just compensation is designed to 
prevent the government from abusing the power of eminent domain. 
Singapore had two options to pursue its redevelopment plan. One was 
to abide by the Constitution, which meant that the government would 
pay just compensation to owners whose properties were taken for 
public use. The other was to eliminate the constitutional guarantee, so 
 
 138. Aya Gruber, Public Housing in Singapore: The Use of Ends-Based Reasoning in the 
Quest for a Workable System, 38 HARV. INT’L L.J. 236, 239 (1997). 
 139. Id. at 247–49.  
 140. Kevin Tan, Signapore Country Report at 23, in Coordinador de Derecho comparado 
Asia-México, Culturas y Sistemas Jurídicos Comparados (IIJ-UNAM 2007), available at 
http://www.bibliojuridica.org/libros/5/2398/10.pdf. 
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that the government would have no limits when taking private 
property. The PAP chose the latter. In the PAP’s view, compensation 
was an unjustified burden for its redevelopment plan.141  
In 1965, when Singapore separated from Malaysia, the PAP took 
advantage of the opportunity and proposed to exclude Article 13 in 
the new Singaporean Constitution. Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew, 
the founding father of the modern Singapore state, expressed his deep 
concern that the constitutional guarantee would bog down the 
acquisition process, and thus hinder economic development.142 
During a parliamentary debate on whether Article 13 should be 
included in the new Constitution, Mr. Lee made his view 
unequivocal:  
We have specifically set out to exclude [Article 13] . . . Once 
we spell out that no law shall provide for the compulsory 
acquisition or use of property without adequate compensation, 
we open the door for litigation and ultimately for adjudication 
by the Court on what is or is not adequate compensation.143  
Mr. Lee based his assertion on the lesson that the government 
learned during the construction of the Jurong Industrial Site. In that 
project, the government invested a considerable amount of state funds 
for developing infrastructure. With the completion of the project, the 
value of adjacent land went up rapidly. When the Jurong Industrial 
Site needed to expand and build ancillary services, such as schools 
and hospitals, the government had to pay hefty compensation to 
landowners according to the previous law. In Mr. Lee’s view, had the 
government not developed the industrial site, the value of adjacent 
land would not have appreciated. The government compensation at 
current market price was a windfall for the property owners, who had 
contributed nothing. The enhanced value was “created wholly by the 
expenditure of state funds.”144  
 
 141. Singapore Parliamentary Debates Official Report, 22 December 1965, at columns 
435–36.  
 142. Id.  
 143. Id.  
 144. Id.  
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Since the PAP was the dominant party in Singaporean politics, the 
Parliament passed Mr. Lee’s proposal to exclude Article 13. Despite 
the fact that the Constitution has gone through various changes in the 
last four decades, the current Singaporean Constitution has not yet 
embraced any guarantee that is comparable to the Fifth Amendment 
to the U.S. Constitution. 
Without constitutional constraints, the Parliament passed the Land 
Acquisition Act (“LAA”) in 1966, which granted expansive power to 
the government. Article 5(1) of the LAA provided that private 
property can be taken for the following purposes145:  
Whenever any particular land is needed—  
 (a) for any public purpose;  
 (b) by any person, corporation or statutory board, for any 
work or an undertaking which, in the opinion of the Minister, 
is of public benefit or of public utility or in the public interest; 
or  
 (c) for any residential, commercial or industrial purposes, 
the President may, by notification published in the Gazette, 
declare the land to be required for the purpose specified in the 
notification. 
Article 5 (1) is so inclusive that any takings could fit in its scope. 
In practice, it makes challenging the purpose of government takings 
impossible. In Galstaun v. Attorney-General,146 the owner’s land was 
acquired for the extension of a public road. The owner found that the 
extension project was already finished when his land was acquired. 
As a result, the owner brought an action to court alleging that the 
government did not actually use the acquired land for the road 
extension project as announced in the official gazette. Among other 
claims, the owner sought a declaratory judgment that the purported 
acquisition was illegal on the ground that the government had abused 
its power. The court emphasized the government’s broad power 
 
 145. Tan, supra note 140, at 28.  
 146. Galstaun v. Attorney-General [1981] 1 MLJ 9, at p 10, per FA Chua J.  
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conferred by Section 3 of the Land Acquisition Act and rejected the 
owner’s claim. The court reasoned:  
The government is the proper authority for deciding what a 
public purpose is. When the government declares that a certain 
purpose is a public purpose, it must be presumed that the 
Government is in possession of facts which include the 
Government to declare that the purpose is a public purpose.147 
In Galstaun, the court made it extremely difficult for subsequent 
litigation to succeed over whether a particular taking is for public use. 
This line of reasoning echoes the Berman case, in which the U.S. 
Supreme Court asserted, “Subject to specific constitutional 
limitations, when the legislature has spoken, the public interest has 
been declared in terms well-nigh conclusive.”148 In Singapore, 
unfortunately, there are virtually no limitations on takings, because 
the constitutional guarantee was stripped away from the Constitution.  
Another case, Basco Enterprises PTE LTD v. Soh Siong Wai149 
demonstrates the unchallengeable nature of public purpose doctrine 
in Singaporean Law. In this case, the appellant owned a colonial 
building, Stamford House, located at the center of Singapore. The 
Urban Redevelopment Authority (“URA”), a government agency, 
condemned the building in 1984 for redevelopment. The owner was 
compensated at the building’s 1973 market value. After the title was 
transferred to the URA, the owner learned that the building was 
actually used for cultural preservation. The façade of the building 
was preserved; the interior was used for retail outlets. The URA put 
the house on sale by open public tender at then-current (1988) market 
value. The owner sued the URA, alleging that the URA acted in bad 
faith when it acquired the building because its ultimate use of the 
building was not for the alleged purpose. The owner also contended 
that the URA acted ultra vires by taking private property for cultural 
preservation, a jurisdiction that fell within the exclusive realm of 
another government agency.  
 
 147. Id.  
 148. Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954). 
 149. Basco Enterprises PTE LTD v. Soh Siong Wai [1989] 1 SLR 150. 
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The Court dismissed the owner’s claims and ruled in favor of the 
URA. It is not clear whether Judge Keong read the Berman case, yet 
his reasoning strikingly resembled that in Berman. First, Judge 
Keong stated that the building at issue should not be considered in 
isolation because the redevelopment project affected other buildings 
in the area. After confirming the broad ambit of urban 
redevelopment, the Court held that the URA was the proper agency to 
decide how to use the condemned buildings. Second, Judge Keong 
was reluctant to second-guess the government’s decision. He 
reasoned that “[i]t is not necessary for [the Court] to decide the 
narrower point [of whether] Stamford House had been acquired alone 
for urban redevelopment.”150 
2. Compensation  
In Singapore, the compensation for condemned property is based 
on market value. The meaning of market value, however, differs 
greatly from that in the U.S. The general rule in the U.S. is that the 
value of the condemned property is fixed at the time the property is 
taken.151 In Singapore, the price is determined by the market value at 
either of the two retrospective dates set in the law. If there is a 
difference between the values, the lower is applicable. This 
compensation scheme is laid out in Section 33 of the Land 
Compensation Act (“LCA”),152 which provides:  
Section 33. —(1) In determining the amount of compensation 
to be awarded for land acquired under this Act, the Board 
shall. . .take into consideration the following matters and no 
others:  
 (a) the market value —  
 
 150. Id.  
 151. 4-12A NICHOLS ON EMINENT DOMAIN § 12A.01 (1997). 
 152. N. KHUBLALL, COMPULSORY LAND ACQUISITION—SINGAPORE AND MALAYSIA 118 
(2d ed. 1994). 
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(i)  
 (A) as at 1st January 1986 in respect of land acquired on or 
after 30th November 1987 but before 18th January 1993;  
 (B) as at 1st January 1992 in respect of land acquired on or 
after 18th January 1993 but before 27th September 1995; and  
 (C) as at 1st January 1995 in respect of land acquired on or 
after 27th September 1995;  
. . . whichever is the lower. 
The objective of this provision was to ensure that property owners 
would not be unjustly enriched by any government-funded project. Its 
unfairness, however, is evident in the decision of Collector of Land 
Revenue v. Ang Thian Soo.153 At issue in this case was whether the 
compensation should be based on the market value as of the 
retrospective date set in Section 33(1)(a)(i), or as of the date of 
acquisition. Based on the former standard, Mr. Soo would only be 
paid $236,450, despite the fact that he bought the house for $335,000. 
If the latter standard applied, the compensation award would be as 
much as $670,000.  
What made this case unique was that the construction of Soo’s 
house was not finished until four years after the retrospective date for 
compensation set in the law. Mr. Soo argued that the retrospective 
date was irrelevant in valuing his house because the house was not 
built, and thus it did not have any market value at that time. In 
supporting his argument, Soo cited two similar cases, in which 
owners were compensated according to the values at the date of 
condemnation, because their houses did not exist at the retrospective 
date. The trial court (the Board) accepted Soo’s argument and ruled 
that the compensation should be based on the date of acquisition and 
awarded Soo with $670,000 in compensation. The Collector appealed 
the decision to the Appellate Court, which not only overruled the trial 
court decision, but also the two cases that Soo cited. The Appellate 
Court’s approach was straightforward. It literately applied the 
original text of Section 33(1)(a), and concluded that Mr. Soo’s 
 
 153. Collector of Land Revenue v. Ang Thian Soo [1990] 1 SLR 11.  
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argument was contrary to the express words of the law. It held that 
the acquisitioned property should only be valued at the dates set in 
the law, whichever is the lower amount, with no other factors 
considered. Consequently, the only evaluation standard applicable in 
this case was the lower of the prescribed market values. Therefore, 
the Appellate Court reduced the amount of the compensation from 
$670,000 to $260,000.154  
This case elicited heavy criticism from Singaporean scholars, 
because it ran afoul of the basic principle of the takings law 
commonly recognized in the academia.155 The ruling in the Soo case 
rendered the property owner in a much worse situation. Professor 
Khulall commented that the current scheme for compensation was 
unfair and should be changed, because property owners in Singapore 
“w[ere] unreasonably penalized when their property [was] 
condemned”156:  
In this day and age, when land values are generally rising, it is 
wrong both in principle and in equity to award compensation 
on the basis of a retrospective date. It is abundantly clear that a 
dispossessed landowner cannot get the equivalent in 
compensation what he is compelled to give up.157  
Another distinct aspect of the Singaporean law regarding 
compensation is the setoff provision.158 It is laid out in Clause (b) of 
Section 33(1). This provision requires that the Board of Appeal 
consider any increase in the value of an interested owner’s other 
property that is “likely to accrue from the use to which the land 
acquired will be put.”159 In other words, this provision means that if 
the new development after the takings is likely to increase the value 
of the owner’s remaining property, the increased value (or 
betterment) should be set off against the compensation for the 
owner’s condemned property.  
 
 154. Id.  
 155. Khublall, supra note 152, at 119.  
 156. Id. at 120.  
 157. Id. at 119–20.  
 158. Id. at 199.  
 159. Id.  
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The setoff clause has its origin in Section 7 of the English Land 
Compensation Act of 1961, which provides:  
Where the vendor retains any contiguous or adjacent land, the 
value of which is enhanced by development carried out or 
proposed to be carried out under the ‘scheme’, the betterment 
is to be set-off against the compensation otherwise payable.160  
The Singaporean law is more stringent than the English provision, 
because it does not require the owner’s remaining land to be 
contiguous or adjacent to the condemned property. Any enhancement 
that the new development would bring to the owner’s remaining 
property, no matter where it is located, will be offset against the 
compensation for the part taken.161  
In practice, however, it is difficult for the court to apply the setoff 
provision for two reasons.162 First, it is almost impossible to 
accurately assess how much a new development project will enhance 
the owner’s remaining property. For a new project to be profitable, it 
usually takes years, if not decades, to see the results. In reality, some 
projects may seem promising, but fail in the end. Neither the owners, 
nor the collector can guarantee the success of the project. Second, 
supposing that the project is successful, it is still difficult to ascertain 
how the project will enhance the owner’s interests. The owner may 
be tangentially benefited from the new development as a member of 
the public. It would be unfair to count the general benefit against the 
compensation for the owner’s condemned property.  
 
 160. The setoff principle can be found in other English legislation regarding land 
acquisition. For example, Avon Weir Act of 1992, Section 33 provides:  
(2) In assessing the compensation payable to any person on the acquisition by the 
Corporation from him of any relevant land, the tribunal shall— (a) have regard to the 
extent to which the land or the remaining contiguous lands belonging to the same 
person may be benefited by any of the works; and (b) set off against the compensation 
payable any increase in value of the remaining contiguous lands belonging to the same 
person which will accrue to him by reason of the construction of any of the works. 
(emphasis added). The full text of Avon Weir Act of 1992 is available at the Office of Public 
Sector Information (OPSI)’s website: http://www.opsi.gov.uk/ACTS/locact92/Ukla_19920005_ 
en_4.htm#mdiv33. 
 161. KHUBLALL, supra note 149, at 119.  
 162. Id.  
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3. Not a Model for China 
Tourists are fond of the views of skyscrapers, which symbolize 
Singapore’s modernity and prosperity. Scholars enjoy touting sharp 
growth charts and persuading developing countries to copy the same 
model—pursuing an economic miracle at minimum costs. Very few, 
however, have frankly focused on the tremendous social costs 
associated with the making of so called “miracles,” the negative 
impact of which may not be immediately seen.  
Suppressing individual freedom and denying property owners just 
compensation have a devastating impact on the public. It is a 
miscalculation when social costs are not taken into consideration. As 
a commentator noted:  
The omnipresence of a paternalistic government indicates that 
[Singapore] is in danger of losing its soul. In a world where 
personal freedoms often give fundamental definition to one’s 
existence, the leadership of Singapore appears bent on 
subordinating such freedoms in favor of its national agenda 
aimed at economic success.163  
Singapore’s economic achievement is undeniably impressive and 
as such, the Singapore model sounds appealing to many leaders in 
China who are striving to achieve visible results during a short period 
of time, usually within a five-year tenure. The questionable means 
that the Singapore government utilized to reach the end would not 
however prove beneficial to China in the long run. Social riots and 
other serious problems demonstrate that China cannot afford to 
ignore social justice during its course of economic growth.  
C. Administrative Costs for Eminent Domain Compared 
The takings laws presuppose that government can take private 
property without the owner’s consent. But that does not mean that the 
government has unlimited power to utilize the power of takings. In 
the United States, the taking clause provides two limitations on the 
 
 163. Aya Gruber, Public Housing in Singapore: The Use of Ends-Based Reasoning in the 
Quest for a Workable System, 38 HARV. INT’L L.J. 236, 237 (1997).  
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government: private owners are entitled to just compensation and the 
project has to be for public use. The public use requirement limits the 
very scope of the eminent domain power. Government may compel 
an individual to forfeit her property for the public’s use, but not for 
the benefit of another private person. This requirement promotes 
fairness as well as security.164 The purpose of the just compensation 
requirement is to spread the cost of condemnations and thus 
“prevents the public from loading upon one individual more than his 
just share of the burdens of government.”165 The administrative costs 
serve as deterrence against abuse of eminent domain power.  
Merrill’s administrative costs of eminent domain (as described in 
the introduction) serve as a unique benchmark in comparing takings 
laws in China, the U.S., and Singapore, despite their drastically 
divergent political, legal and economic backdrops. According to 
Merrill,166 the probable relations among the exercise of eminent 
domain power, transaction costs and administrative costs are as 
follows:  
Eminent domain becomes economically attractive, when the 
transaction costs of open market exchange exceeds the 
administrative costs of exercising eminent domain. When the 
costs of market exchange fall below administrative costs, 
eminent domain becomes undesirable.  
The administrative costs are relatively independent of the 
fluctuations of rent-seeking opportunities. It means that the 
government should not lower the costs just because a new 
development has a great potential to bring in more tax revenue than 
private owners. Additionally, administrative costs should be higher 
than transactions costs in a highly competitive market. This 
requirement is important because it ensures that the government can 
only use eminent domain as a last resort. In order to apply the theory 
in the comparison, Merrill’s model is reproduced in the following 
 
 164. Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 
302, 336 (2002) (“The concepts of ‘fairness and justice’ . . . underlie the Takings Clause . . . .”).  
 165. Monongahela Nav. Co. v. United States, 148 U.S. 312, 325 (1893); see also 
Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960). 
 166. See supra note 1.  
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chart. Eminent domain is economically viable in the markets to the 
left of X (i.e. the so-called “thin markets”).  
 
To take Merrill’s theory one step further, one corollary to be 
drawn is that the likelihood of the abuse of eminent domain power 
will increase when the administrative costs are artificially low. The 
comparisons in previous sections attest to this assertion. The 
administrative costs in China are extremely low because the 
government has the sole power to draw development plans without 
public consultation. It even has the power to redraw zoning maps to 
legitimize a particular development project. The government 
deliberately sets property value low in compensating property 
owners. Property owners are not entitled to genuine public hearings 
before takings, do not have an effective means of challenging 
government decisions, and are often forced to move without proper 
notice. The low administrative costs have made eminent domain 
extremely appealing to commercial developers. As a result, the abuse 
of eminent domain powers has been prevalent (as discussed in Parts I 
and II). The same is also true with Singapore, where the ruling party 
stripped off the constitutional guarantee from its new constitution 
merely for the convenience of taking private properties. By pegging 
compensation value retrospectively to outdated “market value,” the 
Singaporean law has substantially reduced the administrative costs of 
Q 
P  TC  
TKM  TNM  
P: price of land; Q: quantity of land (number of land sellers) 
TC: transaction costs if purchasing from the open market 
AC: Administrative costs for enforcing eminent domain, or called “due process 
costs.” 
TNM: thin market; TKM: thick market 
X 
AC 
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government takings, which contributed to the widespread practice of 
takings in the 1960s.  
The following diagram depicts the administrative costs in China 
and Singapore are substantially lower than that in the U.S. In theory, 
low administrative costs account for the abuse of eminent domain 
power in China and Singapore.  
 
 
 
IV. CONCLUSION: IDEOLOGY, REALITY, AND ADMINISTRATIVE 
COSTS 
It is difficult to know exactly how a particular government 
determines the justifiable level of administrative costs necessary for 
takings of private properties. One related factor, however, is certainly 
the ideological beliefs that underline almost all governmental actions.  
As Douglass North observed, “the ‘reality’ of a political-economic 
system is never known to anyone, but humans do construct elaborate 
beliefs about the nature of that ‘reality’—beliefs that are both a 
positive model of the way the system works and a normative model 
of how it should work.”167 The case of urban housing ownership 
studied by this paper provides support for North’s assertion. Since the 
establishment of the People’s Republic of China in 1949, urban home 
 
 167. DOUGLASS C. NORTH, UNDERSTANDING THE PROCESS OF ECONOMIC CHANGE 2 
(2005).  
AC in U.S. 
AC in China or Singapore 
Q 
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TC  
TKM  TNM  
P: price of land; Q: quantity of land (number of land sellers) 
TC: transaction costs if purchasing from the open market; AC: Administrative 
costs for enforcing eminent domain, or called “due process costs.” 
TNM: thin market; TKM: thick market 
p 301 Liu book pages.doc  7/29/2008 10:42:00 AM 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
348 Journal of Law & Policy [Vol. 26:301 
 
 
ownership, as with other property rights, has gone through dramatic 
changes—from private to public and then back to private ownership 
again. Underlying these changes are various ideological beliefs to 
which the Communist-led government subscribed at different times.  
In its first three decades, the government faithfully practiced 
Marxism. Consequently, abolition of private property was on the top 
of the government’s agenda.168 Following a Soviet model, the 
government implemented Marxism in every aspect of social and 
economic life. Private land was confiscated and landlords were either 
imprisoned or executed. Even though the government briefly allowed 
private ownership of urban housing for pragmatic reasons, it quickly 
claimed private housing as an obstacle for building the socialist 
economy. In the late 1950s, the government began the so-called 
socialization movement with a goal to eliminate the private economy. 
During that period, private housing owners were forced to lease their 
houses at reduced prices set by the government.  
By the late 1960s, when the “Cultural Revolution” broke out, 
private home ownership ceased to exist. By using formidable means, 
the government carried out massive appropriations of private 
property without compensation and due process. The lawless takings 
inflicted serious injustice, but it did accomplish the government’s 
purported goal: transforming private ownership to public ownership. 
Apparently, the justification for the takings was Marx’s assertion that 
public ownership was superior to private ownership. Public 
ownership was the very basis of a planned economy, which was 
perceived as the only way to maximize productivity. After the 
transformation, the government was the sole source for urban 
housing. Public ownership did not increase productivity. The 
government fell far short of achieving its goal of providing free 
housing for everyone. The allocation system was neither fair nor 
efficient. Further, the government experienced severe financial 
constraints because of the housing expenditure. All of this proved 
that the public housing system was a complete failure.  
The second overhaul of the property institution took place in the 
late 1970s, when Deng Xiaoping initiated economic reforms. These 
 
 168. KARL MARX, THE COMMUNIST MANIFESTO (1954). “[T]he theory of the Communists 
may be summed up in the single sentence: Abolition of private property.” 
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changes were based on the belief that public and private ownership 
were not mutually exclusive. Drawing from the experience of 
developed economies, Deng was convinced that private ownership 
could facilitate economic growth more than public ownership. In 
order to reach a broad consensus, Deng launched a public 
campaign—“finding truth from facts.” During the campaign, Deng 
articulated his famous “Cat Doctrine” (a cat is good if it catches mice 
no matter whether it is black or white). The implication of the Cat 
Doctrine was that the line between private ownership and public 
ownership was no longer a necessary one. The ideological shift from 
Marxism to Marketism (or GDPism) heralded a new era in China. 
Subsequently, the People’s Congress made a series of constitutional 
changes that gradually recognized the legal status of private property. 
Against this backdrop, the government began urban housing and land 
reforms.  
As previously discussed, the housing and land reforms resulted in 
a unique limitation in that homeowners do not own the land 
underneath their houses. The driving force for the land reform is the 
government’s desire to attract foreign investment and profit from the 
sale of land use rights. The impact of the land reform on housing 
reform, however, has been tremendous. The result of the reform is the 
separation of land use rights and land ownership. After the reform, 
individuals are able to purchase not only houses, but also the use 
rights of the land on which their houses stand for up to 70 years. 
Although the state still retains land ownership, the land reform has 
greatly facilitated real estate transactions, and motivated individuals 
to invest in the real estate market. Another impact of the land reform 
is that it has also opened up opportunities for developers to obtain 
land use rights for commercial development. Since land resources in 
China are extremely limited, commercial development is usually 
carried out in populous residential areas. As a result, the allocation of 
land use rights between private property protection and commercial 
development has become a controversial issue. The government, 
however, is not well prepared for the conflict with private ownership 
and economic development. Only a few years into the reforms, new 
homeowners found that their properties were obstacles in the way of 
economic development. In the unbalanced tug-of-war between 
individual homeowners and deep-pocketed developers, the 
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government sided with the latter by changing zoning plans to fit 
commercial development, authorizing forced evictions, deploying 
judicial police to execute eviction orders, lowering compensation 
standards, instructing courts not to hear cases involving demolitions, 
blocking class actions, etc.  
After decades of communist ideological influence, social 
disapproval of strong private ownership still prevails. The deep-
rooted prejudice against private ownership explains why conservative 
scholars strongly resisted the very first Property Code. While the 
National People’s Congress was about to pass the Property Code after 
over a decade of preparation, Dr. Gong, a constitutional law 
Professor at Beijing University, published his influential (his 
opponents say notorious) open letter claiming that the Property Code 
that would recognize the protection of private ownership seriously 
violates the basic constitutional principle on public ownership.169 
Because of Gong’s accusation, the Congress put the deliberation of 
the law on hold for one year.170 The Code was finally passed in 
March and took effect in October 2007. Only with this background in 
mind can one fully understand the reason why ordinary private 
owners are facing enormous difficulties in asserting their legitimate 
rights. In case of confrontations between individual homeowners and 
deep-pocketed developers, the government has consistently sided 
with the latter. 
Applying GDPism to eminent domain, the government gives full 
backing to commercial real estate development. In order to attract 
investment, increase economic growth, and improve national image, 
the government narrowly construes administrative costs as the sheer 
costs for developers. The value of private property is consequently 
left out of the equation. In the absence of a system of enforceable 
 
 169. Article 6 of the Constitutional of China provides: The basis of the socialist economic 
system of the People’s Republic of China is socialist public ownership of the means of 
production, namely, ownership by the whole people and collective ownership by the working 
people. The system of socialist public ownership supersedes the system of exploitation of man 
by man; it applies the principle of ‘from each according to his ability, to each according to his 
work.’ 
 170. See ZHANG FENGJUAN, GUOJIA SUOYOU QUAN ZHUTI FENXI [AN ANALYSIS OF STATE 
OWNERSHIP], available at http://www.honglaw.com.cn/Article_Show.asp?ArticleID=15108.  
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property rights, the costs of economic development unfairly shift to 
powerless private owners. 
